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About the MIT Japan Program
and its Working Paper Series
The MIT Japan Program was founded in 1981 to create a new generation
of technologically sophisticated Japan-aware" scientists, engineers, and
managers in the United States. The Program's corporate sponsors, as well
as support from the government and from private foundations, have made
it the largest, most comprehensive, and most widely emulated center of
applied Japanese studies in the world.
The intellectual focus of the Program is to integrate the research
methodologies of the social sciences, the humanities, and technology to
approach issues confronting the United States and Japan in their relations
involving science and technology. The Program is uniquely positioned to
make use of MIT's extensive network of Japan-related resources, which
include faculty, researchers, and library collections, as well as a Tokyo-
based office. Through its three core activities, namely, education,
research, and public awareness, the Program disseminates both to its
sponsors and to the interested public its expertise on Japanese science
and technology and on how that science and technology is managed.
The MIT Japan Program Working Paper Series provides an important
means to achieving these ends.
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2MITI's Successes and Failures in Controlling
Japan' s Technology Imports
by Leonard H. Lynn
ABSTRACT
Researchers have drawn conflicting conclusions about
Japan's experience with government controls over technology
imports in the 1950s and 1960s. Some suggest that these
controls helped Japan get foreign technology at low cost.
The imports of basic oxygen steelmaking and various computer
technologies seem to support this position. Others argue
that Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) could not possibly have effectively monitored the
large number of technologies imported. The controls may have
been irrelevant. Other researchers point to MITI's apparent
ineptitude in overseeing the import of transistor and
polypropyene technology as evidence that government
involvement was harmful. This paper re-examines both
quantitative data on the imports and the cases that have
been most often offered in assessing the role of MITI. The
paper suggests that MITI did have the resources to
effectively control technology imports. It suggests that the
MITI role was generally positive for Japan, but largely
because of unusual conditions pertaining at the time.
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3Government control over technology imports is often
characterized as having been a central component of Japanese
industrial policy in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. As Johnson
(1982) puts it (p. 17): "Before the capital liberalization
of the late 1960's and 1970's, no technology entered the
country without MITI's [the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry] approval; no joint venture was ever agreed to
without MITI's scrutiny and frequent alteration of the
terms; no patent rights were ever bought without MITI's
pressuring the seller to lower the royalties or to make
other changes advantageous to Japanese industry as a whole;
and no program for the import of foreign technology was ever
approved until MITI and its various advisory committees had
agreed the time was right and that the industry involved was
scheduled for 'nurturing' (ikusei)."
These controls, according to some writers, helped
Japanese firms get technology under extremely favorable
terms (see, for example, Anchorduguy, 1989; Henderson, 1972;
Johnson, 1982; Lynn, 1982; MITI, 1960b; Ozawa, 1974; Peck
and Tamura, 1976). Government withheld or threatened to
withhold approval of agreements that were not judged to be
favorable to the Japanese side. Government also, at least on
occasion, organized potential buyers of foreign technology
to prevent them from bidding up prices. Earlier, when
foreigners distrusted the ability of Japanese firms to make
royalty and other payments, government guaranteed the
payments.
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4Some scholars, however, argue that the Japanese
government's intervention in technology imports was, at
best, irrelevant and may even have been harmful (see, for
example, Friedman, 1988; Komiya, 1988; Trezise and Suzuki,
1976). One issue is whether the government could possibly
have intelligently overseen the import of the thousands of
technologies imported. The skeptics wonder if a government
agency like MITI would not have been swayed to favor
powerful firms, rather than acting toward the more general
good. There is suspicion that government intervention may
have blocked the import of promising technologies, or at
least caused delays.
The Japanese experience matters at the practical level
because policy makers in many countries look to the postwar
Japanese experience as a model for how government can
promote rapid economic development. It matters at the
theoretical level because Japan is often portrayed as the
most successful employer of industrial policies. If Japanese
policies in the 1950s and 1960s were in fact irrelevant or
harmful, it might be wondered if any successful examples of
aggressive policy intervention exist.
Unfortunately, the debate on Japanese technology trade
policy is informed by an extremely narrow empirical basis.
Thousands of major technology agreements were approved by
the Japanese government, but the role of government has been
closely examined in no more than a handful of these, and
then not necessarily in enough detail to permit confident
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conclusions. Further the cases that have been examined have
not been brought together in any systematic analysis.
This paper begins by summarizing the general legal-
bureaucratic structure under which technology was imported
by the Japanese. It next critically reviews the evidence
that has been offered for and against the efficacy of
Japanese technology import control policies. Descriptions
that have appeared in the literature are fleshed out. New
cases that seem relevant are presented, most notably that of
polypropylene. A final section summarizes what we might
conclude from the materials that have been presented. The
overall conclusion is that government involvement in the
technology import process was important, though perhaps not
as powerful as is often suggested. The consequences of this
involvement are seen as having been positive overall for
Japan, though primarily within the limited historical
context of the 1950s and 1960s.
The Mechanisms for Government Control Over Technology
Imports
At the end of World War II Japanese industry had fallen
far behind its counterparts in the United States and Western
Europe. Japan had been cut off from the flows of technical
information beginning in the 1930s and until the end of the
war in 1945 (Goto, 1993). Indeed, even in the first postwar
years Occupation authorities tightly controlled Japan's
foreign political and economic dealings and also imposed
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6restrictions on research and industrial activities in many
areas (Moritani, 1986).
As the Japanese regained control over their economy, a
major goal was to close the gap with industries in the
United States and Europe by importing technology. One
problem was that the Japanese did not have dollars or other
hard currencies to pay for technology and there was no
international market for the yen. Through the 1950s and most
of the 1960s Japan was plagued with balance of payments
deficits. A solution might have been to devalue the yen, but
this was apparently not given serious consideration by the
Japanese government (Kosai, 1989). Instead foreign currency
reserves were carefully rationed so that food, raw
materials, and the most strategically important foreign
technologies could be imported.
In 1949 and 1950 laws were enacted to control the flows
of currency to and from Japan. The 1950 Foreign Investment
Law (FIL) covered technology agreements lasting more than a
year or in which royalties or other payments were to be made
over a period of more than one year. Most analyses of
Japan's technology imports including that in this paper
focus on agreements covered by this law. Other technology
agreements came under the 1949 Foreign Exchange and Foreign
Trade Control Law (1960b). Under these laws government
approval was required before technology could be imported
into Japan. If approval were given, however, payments to the
foreign suppliers of the technology could be guaranteed.
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7The laws changed over time and controls became less and less
stringent, but remained in effect until 1980. Henderson,
(1973) has characterized this regime as it existed until at
least 1972 as the most restrictive by any major country in
the world.
A common Japanese view, especially in the early 1950s,
was that the purchase of foreign technologies was
potentially damaging. Importing a technology just to get the
right to use a foreign trademark, for example, was regarded
as wasting scarce foreign exchange. Some imported
technologies were seen as doing no more than replacing
perfectly adequate domestic technologies. Still others were
regarded as tempting companies to neglect the development of
their own technology, or using funds that otherwise would
have been used for domestic research. It was also feared
that foreign firms would use their technologies to gain
control over sectors of the Japanese economy (MITI, 1960a;
1990; Ozaki, 1972).
Thus through the 1950s technology imports were only to
be approved if a good case could be made that the technology
would contribute to Japan's balance of payments situation
and/or to the growth and development of important
industries. In practice this fear of foreign technologies
diminished somewhat through the 1950s. In 1961 government
policy was changed. A technology imports was now supposed to
be approved unless government could show how the import
8would be harmful or that the agreement was unfair to the
Japanese buyer.
Japan joined the OECD in 1964 and came under pressure
to further liberalize its technology imports (Ozaki, 1972).
Further liberalization measures in 1968 offered automatic
approval within one month for contracts valued at under
$50,000, though there were numerous exceptions (Wise, 1974;
Henderson, 1973: Peck and Tamura, 1976). In May 1973 capital
imports were liberalized except in certain designated
industries such as computers. In 1976 the designated
industries were also liberalized and in 1980 the FIL was
abolished (Johnson, 1982).
To a degree then, from 1950 until 1960, and then
decreasingly until 1980, the Japanese government had formal
control over all major technology agreements between
Japanese firms and foreigners. The formal, legally mandated
process was rather complicated and involved many parts of
the government.
A firm submitted its application for a technology
import to the Ministry of Finance (MOF). MOF sent copies of
the application to the Ministry with jurisdiction over the
technology, most often MITI. MITI's Industrial Finance
Section received the application from MOF, and sent it to
whatever MITI section oversaw the technology. Here the
actual review of the technology would take place. Opinions
would be written and reviewed at meetings that included
people from competent sections and bureaus as well as
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9representatives from the Raw Materials and Production
Bureaus and, when appropriate, the Patent Bureau. The
Industrial Finance Section would collect the written
opinions from all concerned and write an opinion for MITI.
The various applications and opinions would be reviewed at
weekly meetings of the executive committee of the Foreign
Exchange Advisory Council. Finally, the Council would
approve the application, reject it, or send it back for
renegotiation (MITI, 1990).
In the case of applications overseen by MITI the key
official was generally the deputy section chief (kacho hosa)
of the relevant section. This person had the most technical
expertise, and the most influence over the approval decision
(Ekonomisuto, 1976; Komiya, 1988). Aside from technical
criteria, the government checked the various conditions in
the agreement. If the agreement called for royalty payments
higher than those paid for similar technologies, included
export restrictions, or required the import of foreign raw
materials, it might be sent back for renegotiation (MITI,
1990). Economic conditions such as balance of payments
deficits might cause the government to delay the approval
process. This appears to have been a factor, for example, in
the drop from 120 agreements approved in 1957 to only 96
agreements approved in 1957, and the bounce back to 153
agreements approved in 1959 (MITI, 1990).
One source, not documented, but apparently primarily
based on the experiences of foreign lawyers in Japan, claims
_1_____1______1________·I___ 1
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that applications were seldom formally denied (Wise, 1974).
Peck and Tamura (1976) report data indicating that from
1962-1966 90.4% of the applications were approved and 4.7%
were still pending -- only 4.6% had been rejected. It is not
known, however, if the rejection rate might have been higher
during the period of intensive scrutiny in the 1950s. Nor is
it known how many applications were informally rejected by
officials before they were formally filed. As we shall see
in the case of polypropylene, the power to reject
applications was used on occasion to considerable effect.
MITI's Ability to Screen Technology Imports
Some have suggested that MITI officials could not have
carefully evaluated the thousands of technologies that
received approval. As Trezise and Suzuki (1976: 788) put it:
"It is possible also to speculate whether the sheer volume
of particular decisions left to the bureaucracy, especially
during the years of full-scale foreign exchange and
quantitative import controls, did not strain the capability
of officials to make the best choices. The procedures
governing imports of technology, for example, required
intensive case-by-case screening until mid-1968. During the
period 1949-1968 some 5,000 type A technology import
agreements (those involving outlays of foreign exchange)
were processed ...."
Friedman (1988: 121-122) notes that: "machine tools,
one of 33 industrial groups in the 'general machinery'
I
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classification, alone had over 220 tie-ups. It would have
been impossible for the bureaucracy, and the Industrial
Machinery Bureau, to have controlled the terms of all of
these agreements."
In response to this line of argument it should be noted
first that the number of technologies reviewed was far
smaller than the number of agreements approved, second that
many of the technologies did not require much review, and
third that the government was well structured to undertake
the review process.
While 5,000 Type A agreements were approved between
1949-68, this does not mean that 5,000 different
technologies had to be reviewed. Many of the agreements were
duplicates. Thirty-three Japanese firms, for example, had
agreements approved to purchase the same black and white
television production technology from RCA (MITI, 1990).
Between 1963 and 1970 duplicate agreements accounted for
between 35.6% and 73.6% of all of Japan's technology imports
(Peck & Tamura, 1976).
Additionally, multiple agreements were often required
to import a single technology. When the basic oxygen furnace
(BOF) technology was imported, for example, separate
agreements were signed for the BOF production technology,
technology to make the vessels in which the steel was
produced, and technology to produce brick to line the
vessels (Lynn, 1982). Firms importing transistor technology
needed to import both patent rights from Western Electric
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and production know-how from RCA (MITI, 1990). Half a dozen
or more technology import agreements were involved in the
construction of each of Japan's new petrochemical centers in
the late 1950s and early 1960s (Kudo, 1990).
Second, many of the agreements did not require much
technical evaluation on the part of officials. Often the
technologies were well-established around the world before
the import (e.g. DDT, streptomycin, radar). Additionally,
many agreements were just for patent rights that would make
it legally possible for Japanese firms to continue in an
industry where they already had the technical know-how. Some
accounts say this was the case with Toyo Rayon's famous
import of Dupont's nylon patents (Kawamura, 1983). Nearly
half the agreements in the 1950s were strictly for patent
rights (MITI, 1990).
Finally, the government had a formidable bureaucracy to
process the agreements. Most discussion has centered on
MITI's role, but other Ministries were also involved. The
Ministry of Transportation, for example, handled the large
number of technologies related to shipbuilding. The Ministry
of Health and Welfare processed technologies in the
pharmaceuticals industry. The Ministries of Finance, Post
and Telecommunications, Agriculture, and Construction also
had their jurisdictions.
What kind of workload faced the bureaucracy in
evaluating technologies? During the 1950s, the period
Trezise and Suzuki are most concerned about, the largest
  111111 ·- ·
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number of Type A imports approved in a single year was 153
agreements in 1959. The largest number of agreements, some
33, involved chemical technology (aside from a very
heterogeneous miscellaneous machinery category). Some of
these agreements were for pharmaceutical or agricultural
technology and would not have been screened by MITI.
Of the 21 technology imports classified as
organic/inorganic chemicals, seven were duplicates (same
technology from the same source). This leaves only 14
different technologies to be evaluated, and during the 1950s
about half of the agreements for chemical technology were
solely for patent rights.
Evaluation of these 14 technologies would have been
divided up amongst three different sections (two for organic
chemicals, the other for inorganic chemicals) in MITI's
Light Industries Bureau. At the time the Light Industries
Bureau included about 240 officials, around a third of whom
dealt with the chemical industry and its products (MITI
(1961).
It would seem, then, that a busy section at MITI during
a busy year might have reviewed no more than one technology
every month or two. To be sure, the number of agreements
increased- sharply during the 1960s. There were about twice
as many imports per year in the early 1960s, around three
times as many per year in the mid 1960s, and more than seven
or eight times as many per year in the late 1960s. As has
been mentioned, however, the level of scrutiny
14
required/allowed was also sharply diminishing during those
years.
How many technologies could a deputy section chief and
his section be expected to review carefully? This question
depends, for course, of what it meant to review a
technology. MITI did not generally undertake large scale
efforts to collect technological information. The firms
brought the information to the Ministry when they submitted
their application (Ekonomisuto, 1985). These materials were
reviewed by engineers who were among the top graduates of
the best university engineering programs. This was
especially true in the 1950s and 1960s because owing to the
lack of attractive alternatives for young engineers in the
1940s and early 1950s, many of the best of them went to work
for the government (Ekonomisuto, 1985; Lynn, 1882).
In brief, it seems the magnitude of the application
review process is substantially exaggerated by the authors
quoted above.
Policies to Encourage Technology Imports
Two aspects of the foreign exchange control laws were
intended to encourage foreign firms to export technology to
Japan. First, the law required the government to list
technologies needed by Japan (MITI, 1960b: p.327; Ozawa,
1974). It is not clear, however, what, if any impact, this
measure had. The literature hardly mentions it.
----L i---'
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Perhaps more significant, the laws offered government
guarantees that foreign firms supplying technology would be
paid. Henderson (1973) argues that this was very important
to the foreign suppliers of technology up until about 1955.
Interestingly, the guarantees seem to have been somewhat
controversial in Japan. A 1960 MITI publication says the
guarantee policy was criticized as a national disgrace
because it was the sort of measure only appropriate for a
backward nation (MITI, 1960a:7). On the other hand, a senior
MITI official of the period argued in a 1985 interview that
the measure was unique internationally and very important in
encouraging imports (Ekonomisuto, 1985). It seems plausible
that the guarantees were useful as Japan re-entered
international trade, but were of diminishing consequence as
Japanese companies became better known internationally.
Policies to Reduce the Price of Technology
It is widely claimed that a major part of Japan's
economic success during the years of rapid growth in the
1950s and 1960s was the ability of Japanese firms to acquire
foreign technologies at very low prices. Some blame U.S. and
European firms for shortsightedly "giving away" technology
to competitors. Another widespread image, however, is of a
"Japan Incorporated," including businesses and government,
collectively overpowering individual Western firms in
negotiations to get technology at very low prices. On the
one hand government is depicted as refusing to allow
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agreements that were not overwhelming favorable to the
Japanese; on the other hand government is depicted as
coordinating the negotiating positions of Japanese firms to
keep prices for technology from being bid up.
"The Two-Against-One Routine"
MITI is often depicted as having regularly intervened to
make technology assistance agreements more favorable to the
Japanese side. Henderson (1973: 231) calls this "the two-
against-one routine," and says: "Most liaison lawyers in the
field have examples of contracts previously signed by the
parties but returned after preliminary talks with MITI
replete with interlineations of (1) reduced duration; (2)
reduced royalty rates; (3) deletions of license-back and
territorial clauses; and (4) reductions of items covered."
MITI (MITI, 1990) records show that, indeed, government
intervened to force changes of the sort Henderson describes
in about 40% of all the technology agreements submitted in
the 1950s.
Furthermore, according to Friedman (1988), the threat of
these adjustments led to compromises by foreign negotiators
even before the agreements were submitted to the government
(p. 244): "Privately, Japanese firms and international
lawyers admit that MITI is sometimes used as a bargaining
device to extract favorable terms from prospective partners.
The Japanese side can claim that license fees, or the right
to use technology, or other aspects of a contract will not
c I re I .·
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be approved by the bureaucracy. In some cases firms will
argue that they are legally prohibited from contracting at
certain terms."
It is difficult to estimate how much benefit Japanese
firms may have gained from government intervention. Peck and
Tamura (1976) found that after the liberalization of
technology imports in the late 1960s, royalty rates paid by
the Japanese did in fact increase, suggesting that
intervention by the government may have reduced costs. It is
possible, however, that the nature of the technologies
imported also changed. Some of the technologies brought in
after liberalization may have been those that were
previously excluded because foreign partners insisted on
high royalties, for example. Alternatively, as Japan's
economy grew and its successes with past technology
introductions became better known foreign firms may have
begun to seek higher royalties (Goto, 1993b).
This discussion of royalty rates should not obscure the
point that the Japanese government was also very much
interested in other contract conditions, some of which may
have been of less importance to the Japanese firms involved.
Because of its foreign exchange concerns, the Japanese
government opposed agreement conditions that restricted the
ability of Japanese firms to export or that required the
purchase of imported equipment or raw materials. It also
blocked technology imports that were accompanied by foreign
managerial control. Kudo (1990) notes that Dupont had a
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18
strict policy of transferring process technologies only to
foreign firms in which it had more than 50% equity, and thus
managerial control. This policy was broken for the first
time in a joint venture with Mitsui Petrochemical in Japan
in 1960 at the insistence of the Japanese government.
While the Japanese firms involved in these negotiations
may have benefitted from contract changes forced by
government, it seems possible that at least in some
instances there were costs to them. Firms might have
preferred lower license fees or royalty payments in place of
the right to export or in place of managerial control, for
example. If the Japanese firm could get foreign exchange it
would presumably have little concern over whether the
sources of raw materials were foreign or domestic.
Trezise and Suzuki (1976) suggest that MITI's blockage
of Texas Instrument's effort to establish a more than 50%
owned subsidiary to make ICs in Japan in the late 1960s
delayed Japanese access to this technology. Anchorduguy
(1989: 29), however, argues that by delaying Texas
Instruments' access to the Japanese market, "... the
government gave the Japanese firms, most of which were
Japan's major computer and telecommunications companies, a
crucial opportunity to build up economic scale before
encountering foreign competition." It is difficult to
reconcile these interpretations, though it is possible that
Anchorduguy's view from 1989 may have revealed less damage
_ I I 1 _11__1·1_______11_1_i-
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to Japanese firms than seemed apparent when Tresize and
Suzuki wrote in 1976.
Keeping Japanese Firms from Bidding up Technology Prices
Given its authority to approve technology import
agreements, MITI would seem to have been in a position to
keep Japanese firms from bidding up prices.
The best documented case of this actually happening
involved the introduction of the basic oxygen furnace (BOF)
steelmaking process from Austria in 1956-1957. Several
Japanese steelmakers had become interested in this
technology and were independently approaching its
developers. Concerned that this would drive up the price of
the technology, MITI officials called together a meeting of
senior managers from the companies and orchestrated an
arrangement whereby an association of the companies would
collectively buy rights to the technology. In effect, two
companies would jointly bargain with the Austrians on behalf
of the Japanese industry. The cost to Japanese steelmakers
of using the technology ended up being a fraction of a cent
per ton of the steel produced with it, compared with a cost
to steelmakers in other countries of 25 to 50 cents a ton.
One reason the price per ton ended up being so low was
that both the Japanese and the Austrians underestimated the
future growth of the Japanese steel industry. Even if their
estimates had been accurate, however, the price to the
Japanese would still have been only seven or eight cents
_111 _1__
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per ton, less than a third that of the price to steelmakers
in other countries. The major reason for the low price seems
to have been the lack of competition between potential
buyers on the Japanese side (Lynn, 1982).
Some sources, however, suggest that this scenario may
have been unusual (Goto, 1993; Ekonomisuto, 1985; MITI,
1990). The most often cited counterexample is that of
polypropylene, a polymer used in such products as film and
injection molded plastics. Since this case has been widely
referred to, but not described in much detail, a somewhat
detailed description is provided here.
The Competition to import polypropylene
While the petrochemical industry grew rapidly in North
America and Europe in the years after World War II, Japan
had no true petrochemical industry. This was seen as a
problem by government officials in the early and mid-1950s.
Petrochemical imports were beginning to increase. and new
demand was developing as Japanese textile firms (with strong
government encouragement) began the production of synthetic
fibers. Given the concern of policy makers at the time to
increase Japanese economic self-sufficiency and to move into
prestigious high technology areas, it is not surprising that
the government wanted to develop a domestic petrochemical
industry (Hirakawa, 1972).
I _I __
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In 1954 and 1955 an overall policy was developed by the
Light Industries Bureau of MITI in consultation with
industry to "nurture" a petrochemical industry. Former
Japanese Navy and Army fuel depots were sold to provide
sites for "Kombinats," (petrochemical centers made up of
coalitions of firms), special loans were granted by a
government bank, tax benefits were offered, and the
government facilitated the import of the needed
technologies. As these policies were developed and enacted
Japan's first specialized petrochemical firms were
established, Mitsui Petrochemical and Nippon Petrochemical
in 1955, and Mitsubishi Petrochemical Industries in 1956.
Sumitomo Chemicals entered the industry around the same
time, but without forming a specialized petrochemical firm.
These four companies are generally categorized as the
forerunners in the industry (Hirakawa, 1972; Kudo, 1990).
The first four companies launched their Kombinats under
the first phase of MITI's plan in the late 1950s. The
Kombinats focussed on the production of eythylene and
polyethylene. These provided a basis for synthetic rubber,
butadiene and other products. Given the perceived
opportunities in this new industry, one government concern
was to ensure that excessive competition did not lead to
overcapacity. Since the new plants required imported
technologies, the government's control over technology
imports served as a major means to control entry into the
industry (ironically, the subsequent lackluster performance
------- I _ ~ 1 __1___ 1~____
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of this industry in Japan is often blamed on its having too
many firms) (Hirakawa, 1972).
The second phase plan began as the first was completed
and extended through the early 1960s. Major government
concerns under the second phase were to attain greater scale
economies by enlarging first phase facilities, and to extend
the range of raw materials and products. The four firms that
had already become general petrochemical firms under the
first phase plan wanted to solidify their positions. Other
firms wanting to enter the industry were looking for new
technologies that might give them a competitive edge. Since
MITI was determined to restrict capacity to projected
demand, it was essential that a firm be one of the first to
import a new technology -- once MITI believed there was
sufficient capacity for a given petrochemical product it
would not allow other firms to license technologies to make
the product. Thus the four petrochemical firms and their
would-be rivals saw themselves in a near life and death
struggle with each other to find and get the rights to
important new technologies (Oyama, 1972).
Meanwhile the Japanese textile industry, one of Japan's
most important industries in the prewar period and in the
first decades after the war, was involved in intense
competition to import or develop new fibers. Toyo Rayon had
scored a major success by getting exclusive rights to nylon
from Dupont in 1951. In 1957 Asahi Kasei gained an edge by
being first to develop acylic fiber technology. In 1958
- __..
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Teijin and Toyo Rayon had jointly imported tetron from ICI
(Uchida, 1966). At the time polypropylene production was
first commercialized it was described as offering potential
as a miracle fiber that would rival nylon. Thus the textile
firms eagerly tied up with petrochemical firms that might
provide them with polypropylene as a raw material for
textiles.
Another factor that contributed to the intense
competition to import polypropylene technology was that the
theoretical advantages of this technology were clear and its
development was widely anticipated (Oyama, 1972; Uchida,
1966). The expected breakthrough occurred in 1955 when G.
Natta of Milan Polytechnic University reported the results
of joint research with Montecatini in which he had
successfully polymerized propylene (Oyama, 1972; Uchida,
1966). In September 1957 Montecatini completed a 6,000 tpy
polypropylene plant.
In 1957 four Japanese firms were still constructing the
ethylene centers that were to make them general
petrochemical producers. The Mitsui and Sumitomo centers
began operations in April 1958, the Mitsubishi center in May
1959 and the Nippon Petrochemical center in June 1959 (Kudo,
1990).
Three of these firms, the affiliates of the old Mitsui,
Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo zaibatsu, were quick to show an
interest in the new technology. Of these firms Mitsui had
the advantage. Mitsui had imported the Ziegler technology
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for making polyethylene. A variant of the Ziegler catalyst
was used in the Montecatini technology, so Ziegler had good
information on the polypropylene technology which he passed
on to Mitsui (Sekiyu Kagaku Kogyokai, 1971). Mitsubishi had
established contacts with Montecatini while building its
ethylene center and was well-informed about the technology,
but was inclined to wait until the technology had been
proven for use in synthetic fibers and elastomers. Sumitomo
Chemical was given information about the technology by an
agency firm and later by Sumitomo Trading (Sumitomo Kagaku,
1981). Nippon Petrochemical, the other firm in the industry,
did not show an aggressive interest in the technology at the
time.
A firm that was hoping to move into the petrochemical
industry, Nissan Chemical, was also very interested in
polypropylene. Nissan Chemical had earlier imported
Montecatini's Fauser Process technology and had served as an
agent in Japan for the Italian company's technology. Senior
managers from Nissan Chemical had tried to negotiate the
purchase of rights to the technology around the time
Montecatini started up its first commercial polypropylene
plant in 1957, but were told to come back some months later
(Sekiyu Kagaku Kogyo, 1971; Nissan Kagaku, 1969).
Mitsui and Nissan Chemical sent senior managers to
negotiate with Montecatini as soon as Montecatini was ready
to receive them. Both firms signed provisional contracts
with Montecatini in February 1958. The contracts were
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contingent on the required approval of MITI and had to be
activated within six months. On hearing of the moves by
these two firms Mitsubishi and Sumitomo both began their own
negotiations with Montecatini (Mitsubishi Yuka, 1988;
Sumitomo Kagaku, 1981).
The Nissan contract covered formed products, sheet,
textiles, elasomers, and all polypropylene technology. The
fee was 900,000 dollars, plus a royalty of 5%. The Mitsui
contracts was apparently similar. Nissan hoped to begin
construction on a polypropylene plant in October 1958
(Nissan Kagaku, 1969).
Both the Mitsui and Nissan agreements were submitted to
MITI, and both were turned down. MITI was convinced that
polypropylene should be produced in Japan, but concluded
that it was too early to import the technology. The
technology had only been in commercial use a short time, and
had not yet been proven viable in products such as synthetic
fibers and elastomers -- products particularly important to
Japan. Further, the Japanese petrochemical industry was
still trying to get its first plants into operation. MITI
worried that the attempt to introduce another new technology
at the .same time might overburden the industry. Finally,
polypropylene would be made from propylene gas, which was a
by-product of ethylene production. It seemed prudent to MITI
to wait until ethylene production was smoothly underway to
ensure that this raw material would be available (Sekiyu
Kagaku Kogyo Kyokai, 1971).
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MITI asked Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Nissan and Sumitomo to
agree to suspend negotiations until the technology was
perfected. In its company history, Sumitomo claims to have
followed the agreement, but complains that the other firms
quickly started secret negotiations with Montecatini
(Sumitomo Kagaku, 1981).
Meanwhile, several German and American firms had begun
the construction of polypropylene plants (Sekiyu Kagaku
Kogyo Kyokai, 1971). During this time polypropylene was
attracting the attention of journalists as being the basis
of a light and strong plastic, as well as a new miracle
textile (Nissan Kagaku, 1969). In September 1959 the Italian
ambassador asked the Japanese Minister of International
Trade and Industry what the Japanese government's intentions
were regarding polypropylene. MITI used this as an
opportunity to re-evaluate the technology. At the time MITI
was planning its second phase program for the petrochemical
industry. Because of the importance of polypropylene
technology, it did not just rely on information from the
companies, but sent its own survey team to Europe. MITI
concluded that it should approve imports of this technology
This restarted the race to import the technology (Sekiyu
Kagaku Kyokai, 1971).
The intense competition between Japanese firms to import
Montecatini's technology was so widespread that it has been
dubbed "the Montecatini Pilgrimage." In all a dozen
companies from the chemical industry and thirteen from the
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textile industry sent people to Montecatini in an effort to
negotiate contracts (Arisawa and Nakayama, 1973). Between
late 1959 and the spring of 1960, it has been claimed,
hardly a day passed that Japanese negotiators could not be
seen at Montecatini's offices (Oyama, 1972).
Mitsui was the first to reach an agreement, on January
16, 1960. It seemed likely that only one or two additional
firms would be allowed by MITI to import the technology,
since two or three plants could meet the demand for
polypropylene that MITI projected at the time. The other
firms rushed into negotiations. Mitsubishi signed a contract
in February. The Mitsui and Mitsubishi contracts were
approved in March (Mitsubishi Yuka, 1988).
The terms of the Mitsui and Mitsubishi agreements were
far worse for Japan than those of the conditional agreements
signed by Mitsui and Nissan in 1958, even though MITI
attempted to use the "two-against-one" strategy to improve
them. Instead of $900,000, the price was now $3,000,000
(Nissan Kagaku, 1969). Some have attributed this to MITI's
ineptness in attempting to control competition between the
Japanese firms that were seeking to import the technology
(Morikawa, 1976).
Although MITI initially felt that Mitsui and Mitsubishi
could handle the demand for polypropylene. Other firms still
desparately wanted a share of the market. When news came to
Nissan Chemical in January 1960 that Mitsui had concluded a
new provisional contract with Montecatini, two Nissan
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managing directors rushed to Italy. In the end, however, the
greatly increased cost of the technology led Nissan to
abandon its plans to produce polypropylene (Nissan Kagaku,
1969).
Sumitomo wanted to negotiate a low cost agreement that
would cover only patent rights, but Montecatini insisted
that Sumitomo accept the same terms as Mitsui and Mitsubishi
(Morikawa, 1976). Sumitomo also had to convince the
government that Japan would need more polypropylene capacity
than Mitsui and Mitsubishi could provide. Some months later
MITI revised its estimates for polypropylene demand and
Sumitomo signed a technology import agreement in December.
The agreement was approved by the government in January 1961
(Sumitomo Kagaku, 1981).
Nissan had dropped out of the race, but another firm,
Shin Nihon Chisso Fertilize (now Chisso), found a new source
of polypropylene technology, a joint venture of Sun Oil and
American Viscose. In May 1960 Chisso submitted a contract
for this technology to MITI for approval. This agreement
was approved the same day as Sumitomo's (Arisawa and
Nakayama, 1973; Mitsubishi Yuka, 1988). Production of
polypropylene was begun in 1962. The product was successful
in many applications, but ironically not in textiles (Nissan
Kagaku, 1969).
In the case of the BOF technology MITI intervention
seems to have reduced costs for the Japanese while in the
case of polypropylene it seems to have raised them. Both
-Ca--
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involved technologies that were considered crucial to
industries that were themselves considered strategic. What
accounts for the difference between the two cases? And which
was more typical?
It might be wondered if the historically close relations
between the steel industry and government in Japan was a
factor. Yawata Steel and Fuji Steel, the two leading
Japanese steelmakers at the time of the basic oxygen furnace
agreement had both been parts of a semi-governmental company
until 1950 (Yonekura, 1994).
There seems, however, to have been no pattern of
cooperation regarding technology in the steel industry and
no pattern of an inability to cooperate in the petrochemical
and textile industries. Managers involved in importing the
basic oxygen technology described intense and sometimes
bitter rivalry between the firms (Lynn, 1982). On the other
hand there were episodes of cooperation to mutual benefit in
buying foreign technology agreements by firms in both the
petrochemical and textile industries. Sumitomo Chemicals and
Mitsui Petrochemical, for example, cooperated in 1956 to get
ethylene technology at a lower price from Stone & Webster of
the U.S. (Kudo, 1990). Toyo Rayon and Teijin cooperated to
negotiate a lower price for polyester technology from
England's ICI (Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun, 1984).
One difference between the BOF and polypropylene cases
is that while only about half a dozen Japanese firms, all of
them steelmakers, had an interest in introducing the basic
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oxygen furnace. Some twenty-five companies were interested
in importing polypropylene technology. The problems of
coordination in the latter case can readily be imagined.
Sheer numbers of Japanese firms interested in technology,
however, did not in themselves always keep MITI from playing
a useful coordinating role. MITI was able, for example, to
organize the more than thirty diverse firms that bought
television receiver production technology from RCA into a
group that successfully lowered royalties for this
technology (MITI, 1990).
It may be that a more important difference between the
BOF and polypropylene technologies was that while the BOF
was a technology to make an existing product by incumbent
producers at a lower cost, the polypropylene process was a
technology to make a new product in an industry that could
only support a few producers. There were on-going plans to
upgrade and expand steelmaking capacity. The BOF allowed
this to be done at lower cost. It was in the interest of the
firms to import the technology, and it was in the interest
of MITI that they all do so.
The firms hoping to import the polypropylene
technology, however, planned to use the technology to enter
a new industry in which minimum economic production scales
and investment costs were very high. If too many firms
entered the industry, many would fail and the resources they
had invested in it would be wasted. Thus MITI wanted to
prevent most of the firm from importing the technology, and
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thus MITI's policies were in direct conflict with what most
of the firms wanted to do. The firms tried to evade MITI's
guidance in the apparent hope that something would work out.
It would take a much larger review of cases than this
to establish authoritatively which pattern, that of the
basic oxygen furnace or that of polypropylene, was more
typical. The reasoning outlined here, however, suggests the
not surprising conclusion that MITI was most likely to
succeed when the interests of both government and most of
the firms seeking a technology were in accord. When MITI
sought to keep powerful firms out of an industry based on
questionable projections of demand it ran into difficulties.
This seems to have been a problem MITI frequently
encountered in the petrochemical industry (Itami, 1991), but
one that has not been much noted in other industries.
The "Well-known" Sony Transistor Case
Substantial attention has been paid to the possibility
that government involvement may have reduced, or at least
slowed down technology transfer to Japan. Those skeptical
of a beneficial role having been played by MITI most often
cite MITI's initial refusal to give Sony a license to import
the transistor. Most cite Trezise and Suzuki (1976) as their
only source for this case (e.g. Goto, 1993a, 1993b; Kosai,
1989; Noble, 1989)
As Trezise and Suzuki (1976: 798) describe the case:
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The amount of net benefit contributed by [MITI's] control
over the import of technology to economic growth may be open
to argument. The Sony Corporation, for example, had to wait
almost two years after 1952 to get approval to import the
transistor technology that it subsequently applied so
successfully to radio manufacture -- the delay caused by a
minor MITI official who had concluded that this then small
company lacked the skills to develop an untried technology.
Similar deals -- and an occasional failure to complete a
deal -- were inevitable. There was, in other words, a price
for the government's intervention, and it may have been a
substantial offset to the gains derived from it.
One might speculate, based on this anecdote, about how
many potential Sonys were ruined by thick-headed MITI
bureaucrats. Or how many technologies were choked to death
at birth by red tape. As Okimoto (1989: 65) puts it:
"Imagine the enormous opportunity costs to the Japanese
electronics industry if Tokyo Tsushin [Sony] had not gone
ahead to sign the transistor patent agreement, which it
presented to MITI as a fait accompli."
Three points need to be made about the Sony case.
First, although the case is generally characterized as
"well-known," it has not been described in detail in the
literature on industrial policy. Trezise and Suzuki's
complete description of the case is given above (Trezise and
Suzuki themselves cite interviews with high-ranking (but
unidentified) Sony officials and an unpublished paper by
Ibuka, 'then chief executive officer of Sony). Secondly, the
Trezise/Suzuki account is misleading, most importantly there
was nowhere near a two year delay. And third, Sony was not
quite so bravely defiant of MITI as Okimoto suggests. The
agreement it signed with Western Electric was contingent on
MITI approval (Nakagawa, 1981), a not uncommon practice
·-- ---- ---·· -
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(recall our discussion of the polypropylene case, or note
the several cases described by Kubo, 1990).
Here is a more extended version of what happened, based
on published interviews with Ibuka (Aida, 1991; Ibuka, 1992;
Kojima, 1993). Apparently if there is a MITI side to the
story, it has never been published.
The transistor was invented at Western Electric by
Shockley and others in 1948. Ibuka says he read about the
new technology in Time or Newsweek at the time, but didn't
regard it as having much commercial value. Ibuka saw little
reason to keep track of the progress of the transistor
technology. Some others in Japan did maintain an interest in
the transistor. The Electronic Communications Research
Laboratory, a government research laboratory that later
became part of NTT. and some private firms began research on
transistors in 1949 (Shinko Kyokai, 1988; Aida, 1991).
Sony's interest in the transistor developed during a
trip Ibuka made to the United States in March to May 1952.
Ibuka was hoping to develop a sense of the potential U.S.
market for tape recorders recently developed by Sony. He was
disappointed in what he found, but while in the U.S.
received a letter from an American friend in Japan. The
letter mentioned that Western Electric was releasing its
transistor patents and suggested that Sony should be
interested in this new technology. As it happened Ibuka was
looking for a new challenge for his technical people now
that they had successfully commercialized the tape recorder
_ _ LI
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and so was particularly receptive to the idea of introducing
a new technology.
Ibuka was unable to get an appointment with the head of
Western Electric's patent division while in the United
States, but a Japanese expatriate offered to continue
efforts on Sony's behalf. Ibuka returned to Japan, discussed
the patent with Akio Morita and other Sony officials. Ibuka
and Morita persuaded the others to begin serious efforts on
the transistor. Meanwhile, Sony's negotiator in the United
States (a sometime stockbroker and agent for the trading
firm Nissho) continued to approach Western Electric. Western
Electric, perhaps not surprisingly, was initially skeptical
about dealing with a company it knew nothing about.
Ibuka visited MITI to indicate Sony's intention to buy
patent rights to the transistor. MITI's reaction was that it
was ridiculous to consider that an unknown company like Sony
with no experience producing vacuum tubes could
commercialize the transistor. MITI's policy regarding the
import of transistor technology favored having large firms
such as Hitachi and Toshiba import not only the patent
rights from Western Electric, but also related know-how and
assistance from RCA. It seemed unlikely that a small firm
could succeed in commercializing the technology with no
guidance except patent rights. Nonetheless, Sony's agent in
the U.S. continued his discussions with Western Electric. It
is important to note that Sony did not have an agreement yet
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at this time, nor did it feel that MITI's early negative
reaction was reason to stop seeking one.
In the summer of 1953 Sony's negotiator in the United
States finally persuaded Western Electric that Sony was a
worthy licensee for the transistor. Western Electric asked
Sony to send someone to sign a license agreement. Akio
Morita was planning a trip to Europe, and arranged to stop
in the United States where he signed the agreement
contingent on MITI's approval. He returned to Japan in
October 1953. When Morita reported the contingent agreement
to MITI, he was rebuked for not clearing the agreement with
MITI before signing it.
This reaction was obviously a setback, but was not seen
as a fatal one. A Sony research group continued to develop
the technology using references provided by Western
Electric. At the end of 1953 MITI reassigned its personnel
including those in the electric/electronics section. Sony's
transistor agreement was approved on February 2, 1954. Other
Japanese firms were later approved to import the technology:
Toshiba in June 1954, Mitsubishi Electric in October 1954,
and Kobe Kogyo (later part of Fujitsu) in November 1954.
The world's first transistor radio was introduced by
Regency of the U.S. in December 1954. Sony was second, about
six months later. Sony might have been first according to
Ibuka, if MITI had supported Sony's efforts to license the
transistor.
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It can be seen from this that the Trezise and Suzuki
claim that MITI intransigence delayed Sony by nearly two
years is greatly inflated. Two years before the agreement
was approved Sony had no interest in the transistor. Indeed,
Sony did not even have a contingency agreement to take to
MITI until four or five months before MITI approved the
agreement. Conceivably, strong support from MITI might have
caused Western Electric to act more quickly, or might have
encouraged Sony to begin its development work on the
transistor a few months earlier. This, however, is mere
speculation and still does not add up to a two year delay.
It should also be noted that though the Sony story has been
taken as showing MITI discrimination against small
entrepreneurial firms (Trezise and Suzuki, 1976; Okimoto,
1989), Sony received approval of its technology import ahead
of the supposedly favored firms such as Toshiba and Hitachi.
While MITI's disparagement of Sony must have been painful
and presumably wasteful of scarce managerial time, it
ultimately did not appear to make much difference.
On the issue of favoritism it should be noted that the
technology import agreements of large well-connected firms
were also delayed on occasion by MITI. A senior Sumitomo
Chemical manager involved in the competition to import
polypropylene technology complained that MITI had favored
Mitsui (Morikawa, 1976). Nonetheless, a few years earlier,
in 1955, Mitsui Chemical also had an important agreement
delayed by MITI. This was for the import of the
·I ____
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polyethylene technology that resulted in Mitsui's entry into
the general petrochemicals industry. Mitsui signed an
agreement for the Ziegler Process ethylene technology on
January 6, 1955. The agreement was not approved until
November. In contrast, when Sumitomo, Mitsubishi and Nippon
Petrochemicals imported polyethylene technologies in the
late 1950s, the approval process was accomplished within two
to four months (Kudo, 1990).
In retrospect MITI's caution about the Mitsui Ziegler
Process agreement seems to have been justified. While the
Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Nippon Petrochemicals start-ups
went smoothly, that of Mitsui did not. Mitsui's agreement
called for payment of $1.2 million dollars plus royalties,
not including know-how. All Mitsui was getting in addition
to the rights to use the Ziegler patents was two notebooks
of laboratory data. MITI hesitated to approve the contract
because know-how and other assistance was not included.
MITI's misgivings were borne out: early stage losses to
Mitsui due to start up problems amounted to some 250 million
yen per month and the company required new infusions of
capital. Mitsui finally had to contract with German chemical
firm for intensive technical assistance.
An opportunity to favor established firms clearly
occurred with the import of television technology. MITI
could have used a "national champion" strategy to nurture a
strong domestic television production industry by closing
the market to weaker firms. Instead it allowed more than
·I
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thirty different companies to import the technology and
enter the industry. Many of these were marginal firms, and
of course most did not long survive as independent producers
of television sets. The point, however, is that MITI seemed
perfectly willing to let the market choose amongst them
(MITI, 1990).
Conclusions
This review of MITI experiences in approving technology
imports suggests several points:
First of all, images of MITI as having unlimited powers
in regulating technology imports seem vastly overdrawn. The
Ministry did not generally attempt to identify technologies
for Japanese firms to import, but rather played the more
passive role of evaluating agreements brought to it by the
firms. The initiative lie with the private sector. The
Ministry could refuse to approve agreements, but in fact
approved more than 90% of them.
It also seems incorrect to depict MITI as having no
power in controlling technology imports. As we have seen,
the bureaucratic apparatus was in place to handle the
numbers of agreements approved in the 1950s and perhaps
through the early 1960s. The power was often exercised.
Small firms such as Sony, medium sized firms such as Nissan
Chemical, and even old Zaibatsu firms such as Mitsui
Chemicals and Sumitomo Chemicals all had technology imports
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blocked or at least delayed by the Ministry. This listing
itself also calls into question the assumption that there
was a systematic bias in favor of old and powerful firms.
Similarly, it does not seem fair to characterize the
government's involvement as generally restricting
competition. This apparently was the intent in the somewhat
atypical case of polypropylene, but the intent was not
realized. Often MITI's actions seem to have been aimed at
maintaining a certain level of competition. This seems to
have been the case, for example, when MITI blocked the
purchase of Orlon technology by Toyo Rayon out of concern
that this technology coupled with other technologies
controlled by Toyo Rayon would give the company too much
market power (Morikawa, 1976).
The issue of whether government control over technology
imports was generally beneficial to the Japanese economy is
controversial. This limited review suggests that it was by
and large beneficial in the Japanese context of the 1950s
and early 1960s. It was beneficial in the following ways:
1. It made selling technology to Japan more attractive
to foreign firms at a time when Japan was largely isolated
from the international economy and Japanese firms were not
well known.
2. It compensated, in part, for the relative lack of
experience of Japanese firms in international business. The
government's records of payments and other conditions
provided benchmarks for agreements. At the time, it should
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be recalled, travel outside Japan was difficult, many prewar
ties with foreign firms had been disrupted by the war, and
the general trading companies (which had played a major role
in prewar technology transfers) had been weakened by
Occupation reforms.
3. It provided a venue, at least, for coordinating the
approaches of Japanese firms to foreign suppliers of
technology. At times at least this seems to have reduced the
price of technology to Japanese. This point should not be
overstated, however. The case of polypropylene suggests its
limitations. Nor was government involvement the only way in
which firms could coordinate approaches to foreign suppliers
of technology.
This conclusion that the controls were favorable does
not suggest that such controls are more generally desirable.
Japan in the 1950s was a country with high technical skills
that had been cut off from technology flows and from normal
commercial relationships for an extended period of time due
to World War II. The country suffered from persistent
shortages of foreign exchange. The numbers of relevant
technologies to import was much smaller than would be true
now.
The conclusion also needs to be tempered by the
realization that other factors also contributed to the
ability of Japanese firms to get the foreign technologies
they needed under favorable terms. Kubo (1990), for example,
notes that in the petrochemical industry there was often
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intense competition on the part of the sellers of technology
to transfer technology to Japan. This may have been true in
some other industries as well. I have noted elsewhere the
role of non-government organizations such as trade
associations and trading companies in facilitating the
search for technologies by Japanese firms (Lynn, 1982; Lynn
and McKeown, 1988). The Japanese firms themselves put a high
priority on collecting technical information overseas.
Foreign sellers often underestimated the potential growth of
the Japanese market and the ability of Japanese firms to
commercialize technology, and thus may have underpriced
their technologies. Finally, the world environment for
commercial technology transfer was unusually favorable.
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